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APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May 1, 1989]

JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
In my view, to determine the proper approach to causation
in this case, we need look only to the Court's opinion in Mt .
Healthy City School Dist?·ict Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S.
274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, a public employee was not rehired, in part because of his exercise of First Amendment
rights and in part because of permissible considerations.
The Court rejected a rule of causation that focused "solely on
whether protected conduct played a part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire," on the grounds that such
a rule could make the employee better off by exercising his
constitutional rights than by doing nothing at all. Id., at
285. Instead, the Court outlined the following approach:
"Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed
upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that his conduct was a 'substan. tial factor' -or, to put it in other words, that it was a
'motivating factor' in the Board's decision not to rehire
him. Respondent having carried that burden, however,
the District Court should have gone on to determine
whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as
to respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the
protected conduct." Id., at 287 (footnote omitted).
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It is not necessary to get into semantic discussions on
whether the Mt. Healthy approach is "but for" causation in
another guise or creates an affirmative defense on the part of
the employer to see its clear application to the issues before
us in this case. As in Mt. Healthy, the District Court found
that the employer was motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate factors. And here, as in Mt . Healthy, and as and
the Court now holds, Hopkins was not required to prove that
the illegitimate factor was the only, principal, or true reason
for the petitioner's action. Rather, as JUSTICE O'CONNOR
states, her burden was to show that the unlawful motive was
a substantial factor in the adverse employment action. The
District Court, as its opinion was construed by the Court of
Appeals, so found, 263 U. S. App. D. C. 321,333,334,825 F.
2d 458, 470, 471 (1987), and I agree that the finding was
supported by the record. The burden of persuasion then
should have shifted to Price Waterhouse to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision ... in the absence of" the unlawful motive.
Mt. Healthy, supra, at 287.
I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that applying this approach to causation in Title VII cases is not a departure from
and does not require modification of the Court's holdings in
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248
(1981), and McDonnell Douglas C01·p. v. Green, 411 U. S.
792 (1973). The Court has made clear that "mixed motive"
cases, such as the present one, are different from pretext
cases such as McDonnell Douglas and BU?·dine. In pretext
cases, "the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives,
but not both, were the 'true' motives behind the decision."
NLRB v. Tmnsportation Management C01·p., 462 U. S. 393,
400, n. 5 (1983). In mixed motive cases, however, there is
no one "true" motive behind the decision. Instead, the decision is a result of multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate. It can hardly be said that our decision in this case
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is a departure from cases that are "inapposite." Ibid. I also
disagree with the dissent's assertion that this approach to
causation is inconsistent with our statement in Burdine that
"[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." 450 U. S., at 253. As
we indicated in Transportation Management Co1·p., the
showing required by Mt. Healthy does not improperly shift
from the plaintiff the ultimate burden of persuasion on
whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against
him or her. See 462 U. S., at 400, n. 5.
Because the Court of Appeals required Price Waterhouse
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
reached the same employment decision in the absence of the
improper motive, rather than merely requiring proof by a
preponderance of the evidence as in Mt. Healthy, I concur in
the judgment reversing this case in part and remanding.
With respect to the employer's burden, however, the plurality seems to require, at least in most cases, that the employer
submit objective evidence that the same result would have
occurred absent the unlawful motivation. Ante, at 21. In
my view, however, there is no special requirement that the
employer carry its burden by objective evidence. In a
mixed motive case, where the legitimate motive found would
have been ample grounds for the action taken, and the employer credibly testifies that the action would have been
taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample
proof. This would even more plainly be the case where the
employer denies any illegitimate motive in the first place but
the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors
motivated the adverse action.*

*I agree with the plurality that if the employer carries this burden,
there has been no violation of Title VIL
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JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.
Today the Court manipulates existing and complex rules
for employment discrimination cases in a way certain to result in confusion. Continued adherence to the evidentiary
scheme established in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine is a
wiser course than creation of more disarray in an area of the
law already difficult for the bench and bar, and so I must
dissent.
Before turning to my reasons for disagreement with the
Court's disposition of the case, it is important to review the
actual holding of today's decision. I read the opinions as
establishing that in a limited number of cases Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and substantial evidence of discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion to
the defendant to show that an adverse employment decision
would have been supported by legitimate reasons. The shift
in the burden of persuasion occurs only where a plaintiff
proves by direct evidence that an unlawful motive was a substantial factor actually relied upon in making the decision.
Ante, at 16-17 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.); ante, at 2 (opinion
of WHITE, J.). As the opinions make plain, the evidentiary
scheme created today is not for every case in which a plaintiff
produces evidence of stray remarks in the workplace. Ante,
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at 21 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); ante, at 17 (opinion of O'CONNOR,

J.).

Where the plaintiff makes the requisite showing, the burden that shifts to the employer is to show that legitimate
employment considerations would have justified the decision
without reference to any impermissible motive. Ante, at 3
(opinion of WHITE, J.); ante, at 18 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.).
The employer's proof on the point is to be presented and reviewed just as with any other evidentiary question: the Court
does not accept the plurality's suggestion that an employer's
evidence need be "objective" or otherwise out of the ordinary. Ante, at 3 (opinion of WHITE, J.).
In sum, the Court alters the evidentiary framework of
McDonnell Douglas and BU?·dine for a closely defined set
of cases. Although JUSTICE O'CONNOR advances some
thoughtful arguments for this change, I remain convinced
that it is unnecessary and unwise. More troubling is the plurality's rationale for today's decision, which includes a number of unfortunate pronouncements on both causation and
methods of proof in employment discrimination cases. To
demonstrate the defects in the plurality's reasoning, it is necessary to discuss first, the standard of causation in Title VII
cases, and second, the burden of proof.

I
The plurality describes this as a case about the standard of
causation under Title VII, ante, at 7, but I respectfully suggest that the description is misleading. Much of the plurality's rhetoric is spent denouncing a "but-for" standard of causation. The theory of Title VII liability the plurality adopts,
however, essentially incorporates the but-for standard. The
importance of today's decision is not the standard of causation it employs, but its shift to the defendant of the burden of
proof. The plurality's causation analysis is misdirected, for
it is clear that, whoever bears the burden of proof on the
issue, Title VII liability requires a finding of but-for causa-

.
)
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tion. See also ante, at 2 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.); ante, at
3, n. (opinion of WHITE, J .).
The words of Title VII are not obscure. The part of the
statute relevant to this case provides that:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer"(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added).
By any normal understanding, the phrase "because of" conveys the idea that the motive in question made a•difference
to the outcome. We use the words this way in everyday
speech. And assuming, as the plurality does, that we ought
to consider the interpretive memorandum prepared by the
statute's drafters, we find that this is what the words meant
to them as well. "To discriminate is to make a distinction, to
make a difference in treatment or favor." 110 Cong. Rec.
7213 (1964). Congress could not have chosen a clearer way
to indicate that proof of liability under Title VII requires
a showing that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
caused the decision at issue.
Our decisions confirm that Title VII is not concerned with
the mere presence of impermissible motives; it is directed to
employment decisions that result from those motives. The
verbal formulae we have used in our precedents are synonymous with but-for causation. Thus we have said that providing different insurance coverage to male and female employees violates the statute by treating the employee "'in a
manner which but-for that person's sex would be different.'"
NewpO?'-t News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co . v. EEOC, 462
U. S. 669, 683 (1983), quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 711 (1978). We have described the relevant question as whether the employment de-
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cision was ''based on" a discriminatory criterion, Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 (1977), or whether the
particular employment decision at issue was "made on the
basis of" an impermissible factor, Cooper v. Fedeml Reserve
Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867, 875 (1984).
What we term ''but-for" cause is the least rigorous standard that is consistent with the approach to causation our
precedents describe. If a motive is not a but-for cause of
an event, then by definition it did not make a difference to
the outcome. The event would have occurred just the same
without it. Common law approaches to causation of ten require proof of but-for cause as a starting point toward proof
of legal cause. The law may require more than but-for
cause, for instance proximate cause, before imposing liability. Any standard less than but-for, however, simply represents a decision to impose liability without causation. As
Dean Prosser puts it, "[a]n act or omission is not regarded
as a cause of an event if the particular event would have
occurred without it." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, &
D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed.
1984).
One of the principal reasons the plurality decision may sow
confusion is that it claims Title VII liability is unrelated to
but-for causation, yet it adopts a but-for standard once it has
placed the burden of proof as to causation upon the employer.
This approach conflates the question whether causation must
be shown with the question of how it is to be shown. Because the plurality's theory of Title VII causation is ultimately consistent with a but-for standard, it might be said
that my disagreement with the plurality's comments on butfor cause is simply academic. See ante, at 2 (opinion of
WHITE, J.). But since those comments seem to influence the
decision, I turn now to that part of the plurality's analysis.
The plurality begins by noting the quite unremarkable fact
that Title VII is written in the present tense. Ante, at 10.
It is unlawful "to fail" or "to refuse" to provide employment

.
J

"

87-1167-DISSENT
PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS

5

benefits on the basis of sex, not "to have failed" or "to have
refused" to have done so. The plurality claims that the present tense excludes a but-for inquiry as the relevant standard
because but-for causation is necessarily concerned with a hypothetical inquiry into how a past event would have occurred
absent the contested motivation. This observation, however, tells us nothing of particular relevance to Title VII or
the cause of action it creates. I am unaware of any federal
prohibitory statute that is written in the past tense. Every
liability determination, including the novel one constructed
by the plurality, necessarily is concerned with the examination of a past event. 1 The plurality's analysis of verb
tense serves only to divert attention from the causation requirement that is made part of the statute by the "because
of" phrase. That phrase, I respectfully submit, embodies a
rather simple concept that the plurality labors to ignore. 2
We are told next that but-for cause is not required, since
the words "because of" do not mean "solely because of."
Ante, at 10. No one contends, however, that sex must be
the sole cause of a decision before there is a Title VII violation. This is a separate question from whether consideration
of sex must be a cause of the decision. Under the accepted
1
The plurality's description of its own standard is both hypothetical and
retrospective. The inquiry seeks to determine whether "if we asked the
employer at the moment of decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant
or employee was a woman." Ante, at 20.
2
The plurality's discussion of overdetermined causes only highlights the
error of its insistence that but-for is not the substantive standard of causation under Title VIL The opinion discusses the situation where two physical forces move an object, and either force acting alone would have moved
the object. Ante, at 11. Translated to the context of Title VII, this situation would arise where an employer took an adverse action in reliance both
on sex and on legitimate reasons, and eithe1· the illegitimate or the legitimate reason standing alone would have produced the action. If this state
of affairs is proved to the factflnder, there will be no liability under the
plurality's own test, for the same decision would have been made had the
illegitimate reason never been considered.
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approach to causation that I have discussed, sex is a cause for
the employment decision whenever, either by itself or in
combination with other factors, it made a difference to the
decision. Discrimination need not be the sole cause in order
for liability to arise, but merely a necessary element of the
set of factors that caused the decision, i. e., a but-for cause.
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Tmil Tmnportation Co., 427
U. S. 273, 282, n. 10 (1976). The plurality seems to say that
since we know the words ''because of" do not mean "solely because of," they must not mean "because of" at all. This does
not follow, as a matter of either semantics or logic.
The plurality's reliance on the "bona fide occupational
qualification" (BFOQ) provisions of Title VII, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2(e), is particularly inapt. The BFOQ provisions
allow an employer, in certain cases, to make an employment
decision of which it is conceded that sex is the cause. That
sex may be the legitimate cause of an employment decision
where gender is a BFOQ is consistent with the opposite command that a decision caused by sex in any other case justifies
the imposition of Title VII liability. This principle does not
support, however, the novel assertion that a violation has occurred where sex made no difference to the outcome.
The most confusing aspect of the plurality's analysis of causation and liability is its internal inconsistency. The plurality begins by saying: ''When ... an employer considers both
gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was 'because of' sex and the other, legitimate considerations-even if we may say later, in the context
of litigation, that the decision would have been the same if
gender had not been taken into account." Ante, at 10. Yet
it goes on to state that "an employer shall not be liable if it
can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account,
it would have come to the same decision." Ante, at 12.
Given the language of the statute, these statements cannot
both be true. Title VII unambiguously states that an employer who makes decisions "because of" sex has violated the

t,
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statute. The plurality's first statement therefore appears to
indicate that an employer who considers illegitimate reasons
when making a decision is a violator. But the opinion then
tells us that the employer who shows that the same decision
would have been made absent consideration of sex is not a violator. If the second statement is to be reconciled with the
language of Title VII, it must be that a decision that would
have been the same absent consideration of sex was not made
"because of" sex. In other words, there is no violation of the
statute absent but-for causation. The plurality's description
of the "same decision" test it adopts supports this view. The
opinion states that "[a] court that finds for a plaintiff under
this standard has effectively concluded that an illegitimate
motive was a 'but-for' cause of the employment decision,"
ante, at 19, and that this "is not an imposition of liability
'where sex made no difference to the outcome,'" ante, at 16,
n. 11.
The plurality attempts to reconcile its internal inconsistency on the causation issue by describing the employer's
showing as an "affirmative defense." This is nothing more
than a label, and one not found in the language or legislative
history of Title VII. Section 703(a)(l) is the statutory basis
of the cause of action, and the Court is obligated to explain
how its disparate treatment decisions are consistent with the
terms of § 703(a)(l), not with general themes of legislative
history or with other parts of the statute that are plainly in:apposite. While the test ultimately adopted by the plurality
may not be inconsistent with the terms of § 703(a)(l), see
infra, at 14, the same cannot be said of the plurality's reasoning with respect to causation. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR describes it, the plurality "reads the causation requirement out
of the statute, and then replaces it with an 'affirmative defense."' Ante, at 15. Labels aside, the import of today's
decision is not that Title VII liability can arise without butfor causation, but that in certain cases it is not the plaintiff
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who must prove the presence of causation, but the defendant
who must prove its absence.

II
We established the order of proof for individual Title VII
disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), and reaffirmed this allocation in
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248
(1981). Under Burdine, once the plaintiff presents a prima
facie case, an inference of discrimination arises. The employer must rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The final burden
of persuasion, however, belongs to the plaintiff. Burdine
makes clear that the "ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id., at
253. See also Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney, 439 U. S. 24, 29 (1978.) (STEVENS, J ., dissenting). 3
I would adhere to this established evidentiary framework,
which provides the appropriate standard for this and other
individual disparate treatment cases. Today's creation of a
new set of rules for "mixed-motive" cases is not mandated by
the statute itself. The Court's attempt at refinement provides limited practical benefits at the cost of confusion and
complexity, with the attendent risk that the trier of fact will
misapprehend the controlling legal principles and reach an incorrect decision.
In view of the plurality's treatment of BU?·dine and our
other disparate treatment cases, it is important first to state
why those cases are dispositive here. The plurality tries to
3

The interpretive memorandum on which the plurality relies makes
plain that "the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would have the burden of proving that discrimination had occurred." 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964). Coupled with its earlier definition of discrimination, the memorandum tells us
that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that an impermissible motive
"made a difference" in the treatment of the plaintiff. This is none other
than the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show but-for cause.

,.
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reconcile its approach with Burdine by announcing that it applies only to a "pretext" case, which it defines as a case in
which the plaintiff attempts to prove that the employer's
proffered explanation is itself false. Ante, at 15-17, and
n. 11. This ignores the language of BU?·dine, which states
that a plaintiff may succeed in meeting her ultimate burden of
persuasion "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 450 U. S., at 256 (emphasis
added). Under the first of these two alternative methods, a
plaintiff meets her burden if she can "persuade the court that
the employment decision more likely than not was motivated
by a discriminatory reason._~• USPS Board of Governm·s v.
Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 717-718 (1983) (BLACKMUN, J ., concurring). The plurality makes no attempt to address this aspect of our cases.
Our opinions make plain that BU?·dine applies to all individual disparate treatment cases, whether the plaintiff offers
direct proof that discrimination motivated the employer's
actions or chooses the indirect method of showing that the
employer's proffered justification is false, that is to say, a
pretext. See Aikens, 460 U. S., at 714, n. 3 ("As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence"). The plurality is mistaken in suggesting that
the plaintiff in a so-called "mixed motives" case will be disadvantaged by having to "squeeze her proof into Burdine's
framework." Ante, at 16. As we acknowledged in McDonnell Douglas, "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII
cases," and the specification of the prima facie case set forth
there "is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U. S., at 802, n. 13. The framework was "never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic." Aikens, 460 U. S., at 715. BU?·dine compels the
employer to come forward with its explanation of the decision
and permits the plaintiff to offer evidence under either of the
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logical methods for proof of discrimination. This is hardly a
framework that confines the plaintiff; still less is it a justification for saying that the ultimate burden of proof must be on
the employer in a mixed motives case. BU?·dine provides an
orderly and adequate way to place both inferential and direct
proof before the factfinder for a determination whether intentional discrimination has caused the employment decision.
Regardless of the character of the evidence presented, we
have consistently held that the ultimate burden "remains at
all times with the plaintiff." Bu1·dine, 450 U. S., at 253.
Aikens illustrates the point. There, the evidence showed
that the plaintiff, a black man, was far more qualified than
any of the white applicants promoted ahead of him. More
important, the testimony showed that "the person responsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous
derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in
particular." 460 U. S., at 713-714, n. 2. Yet the Court in
Aikens reiterated that the case was to be tried under the
proof scheme of Burdine. JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE
BLACKMUN concurred to stress that the plaintiff could prevail
under the Burdine scheme in either of two ways, one of
which was directly to persuade the court that the employment decision was motivated by discrimination. 460 U. S.,
at 718. Aikens leaves no doubt that the so-called "pretext"
framework of Burdine has been considered to provide a flexible means of addressing all individual disparate treatment
claims.
Downplaying the novelty of its opinion, the plurality claims
to have followed a "well-worn path" from our prior cases.
The path may be well-worn, but it is in the wrong forest.
The plurality again relies on Title VII's BFOQ provisions,
under which an employer bears the burden of justifying the
use of a sex-based employment qualification. See Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 332-337 (1977). In the BFOQ
context this is a sensible, indeed necessary, allocation of the
burden, for there by definition sex is the but-for cause of

J.
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the employment decision and the only question remaining is
how the employer can justify it. The same is true of the plurality's citations to Pregnancy Discrimination Act cases,
ante, at 18. In such cases there is no question that pregnancy was the cause of the disputed action. The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and BFOQ cases tell us nothing about the
case where the employer claims not that a sex-based decision
was justified, but that the decision was not sex-based at all.
Closer analogies to the plurality's new approach are found
in Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274
(1977), and NRLB v. Transportation Management Corp.,
462 U. S. 393 (1983), but these cases were decided in different contexts. Mt. Healthy was a First Amendment case involving the firing of a teacher, and Transportation Management involved review of the NLRB's interpretation of the
National Labor Relations Act. The Transportation Management decision was based on the deference that the Court
traditionally accords NLRB interpretations of the statutes it
administers. See 462 U. S., at 402-403. Neither case
therefore tells us why the established Burdine framework
should not continue to govern the order of proof under Title
VII.
In contrast to the plurality, JUSTICE O'CONNOR acknowledges that the approach adopted today is a "departure from
the McDonnell Douglas standard." Ante, at 1. Although
her reasons for supporting this departure are not without
force, they are not dispositive. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR
states, the most that can be said with respect to the Title VII
itself is that ''nothing in the language, history, or purpose
of Title VII prohibits adoption" of the new approach. Ante,
at 9 (emphasis added). JUSTICE O'CONNOR also relies on
analogies from the common law of torts, other types of Title
VII litigation, and our equal protection cases. These analogies demonstrate that shifts in the burden of proof are not
unprecedented in the law of torts or employment discrimination. Nonetheless, I believe continued adherence to the
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Burdine framework is more consistent with the statutory
mandate. Congress' manifest concern with preventing imposition of liability in cases where discriminatory animus did
not actually cause an adverse action, see ante, at 2 (opinion
of O'CONNOR, J.), suggests to me that an affirmative showing
of causation should be required. And the most relevant portion of the legislative history supports just this view. See
n. 3, sup?·a. The limited benefits that are likely to be produced by today's innovation come at the sacrifice of clarity
and practical application.
The potential benefits of the new approach, in my view, are
overstated. First, the Court makes clear that the Price
Wate1·lwuse scheme is applicable only in those cases where
the plaintiff has produced direct and substantial proof that an
impermissible motive was relied upon in making the decision
at issue. The burden shift properly will be found to apply in
only a limited number of employment discrimination cases.
The application of the new scheme, furthermore, will make a
difference only in a smaller subset of cases. The practical
importance of the burden of proof is the "risk of nonpersuasion," and the new system will make a difference only where
the evidence is so evenly balanced that the factfinder cannot
say that either side's explanation of the case is "more likely"
true. This category will not include cases in which the allocation of the burden of proof will be dispositive because of a
complete lack of evidence on the causation issue, cf. Sum1ners v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948) (allocation
of burden dispositive because no evidence of which of two
negligently fired shots hit plaintiff). Rather, Price Wate1·lwuse will apply only to cases in which there is substantial
evidence of reliance on an impermissible motive, as well
as evidence from the employer that legitimate reasons supported its action.
Although the Price Waterhouse system is not for every
case, almost every plaintiff is certain to ask for a Price
Waterlwuse instruction, perhaps on the basis of "stray re-

h
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marks" or other evidence of discriminatory animus. Trial
and appellate courts will therefore be saddled with the task of
developing standards for determining when to apply the burden shift. One of their new tasks will be the generation of a
jurisprudence of the meaning of "substantial factor." Courts
will also be required to make the of ten subtle and difficult distinction between "direct" and "indirect" or "circumstantial"
evidence. Lower courts long have had difficulty applying
McDonnell Douglas and BU?·dine. Addition of a second burden-shifting mechanism, the application of which itself depends on assessment of credibility and a determination
whether evidence is sufficiently direct and substantial, is not
likely to lend clarity to the process. The presence of an existing burden-shifting mechanism distinguishes the individual
disparate treatment case from the tort, class action discrimination, and equal protection cases on which JUSTICE
O'CONNOR relies. The distinction makes JUSTICE WHITE'S
assertions that one "need look only to" Mt. Healthy and
Transportation Management to resolve this case, and that
our Title VII cases in this area are "inapposite," ante, at 1-3,
at best hard to understand.
Confusion in the application of dual burden-shifting mechanisms will be most acute in cases brought under § 1981 or
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), where
courts borrow the Title VII order of proof for the conduct
of jury trials. See, e.g., Note, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 and Tri~l by Jury: Proposals for
Change, 73 Va. L. Rev. 601 (1987) (noting high reversal rate
caused by use of Title VII burden shifting in a jury setting).
Perhaps such cases in the future will require a bifurcated
trial, with the jury retiring first to make the credibility findings necessary to determine whether the plaintiff has proved
that an impermissible factor played a substantial part in the
decision, and later hearing evidence on the "same decision" or
''pretext" issues. Alternatively, perhaps the trial judge will
have the unenviable task of formulating a single instruction
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for the jury on all of the various burdens potentially involved
in the case.
I do not believe the minor refinement in Title VII procedures accomplished by today's holding can justify the difficulties that will accompany it. Rather, I "remain confident that
the McDonnell Douglas framework permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination." Burdine, 450 U. S., at 258. Although the employer does not
bear the burden of persuasion under Burdine, it must offer
clear and reasonably specific reasons for the contested decision, and has every incentive to persuade the trier of fact that
the decision was lawful. Ibid. Further, the suggestion that
the employer should bear the burden of persuasion due to superior access to evidence has little force in the Title VII context, where the liberal discovery rules available to all litigants are supplemented by EEOC investigatory files. Ibid.
In sum, the Burdine framework provides a "sensible, orderly
way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience
as it bears on the critical question of discrimination," Aikens,
460 U. S., at 715, and it should continue to govern the order
of proof in Title VII disparate treatment cases. 4
'The plurality states that it disregards the special context of affirmative
action. Ante, at 8, n. 3. It is not clear that this is possible. Some courts
have held that in a suit challenging an affirmative action plan, the question
of the plan's validity need not be reached unless the plaintiff shows that the
plan was a but-for cause of the adverse decision. See McQuillen v. Wisccmsin Education Associaticm C01mcil, 830 F. 2d 659, 665 (CA7 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U. S. 914 (1988). Presumably it will be easier for a plaintiff to show that consideration of race or sex pursuant to an affirmative
action plan was a substantial factor in a decision, and the court will need
to move on to the question of a plan's validity. Moreover, if the structure
of the burdens of proof in Title VII suits is to be consistent, as might
be expected given the identical statutory language involved, today's decision suggests that plaintiffs should no longer bear the burden of showing
that affirmative action plans are illegal. See Johnson v. Transportation
Agerlcy, 480 U. S. 616, 626-627 (1987).
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III
The ultimate question in every individual disparate treatment case is whether discrimination caused the particular decision at issue. Some of the plurality's comments with respect to the District Court's findings in this case, however,
are potentially misleading. As the plurality notes, the District Court based its liability determination on expert evidence that some evaluations of respondent Hopkins were
based on unconscious sex stereotypes, 0 and on the fact that
Price Waterhouse failed to disclaim reliance on these comments when it conducted the partnership review. The District Court also based liability on Price Waterhouse's failure
to "make partners sensitive to the dangers [of stereotyping],
to discourage comments tainted by sexism, or to investigate
comments to determine whether they were influenced-by stereotypes." 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (DC 1985).
Although the District Court's version of Title VII liability
is improper under any of today's opinions, I think it important to stress that Title VII creates no independent cause of
action for sex stereotyping. Evidence of use by decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite relevant to the
question of discriminatory intent. The ultimate question,
'The plaintiff who engages the services of Dr. Susan Fiske should have
no trouble showing that sex discrimination played a part in any decision.
Price Waterhouse chose not to object to Fiske's testimony, and at this
late stage we are constrained to accept it, but I think the plurality's enthusiasm for Fiske's conclusions unwarranted. Fiske purported to discern
stereotyping in comments that were gender neutral-e. g., "overbearing
and abrasive"-without any knowledge of the comments' basis in reality
and without having met the speaker or subject. "To an expert of Dr.
Fiske's qualifications, it seems plain that no woman could be overbearing,
arrogant, or abrasive: any observations to that effect would necessarily
be discounted as the product of stereotyping. If analysis like this is
to prevail in federal courts, no employer can base any adverse action as
to a woman on such attributes." 825 F . 2d 458, 477 (1987) (Williams, J .,
dissenting). Today's opinions cannot be read as requiring factftnders to
credit testimony based on this type of analysis. See also ante, at 17 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.).
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however, is whether discrimination caused the plaintiff's
harm. Our cases do not support the suggestion that failure
to "disclaim reliance" on stereotypical comments itself violates Title VII. Neither do they support creation of a "duty
to sensitize." As the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals observed, acceptance of such theories would turn Title
VII "from a prohibition of discriminatory conduct into an engine for rooting out sexist thoughts." 263 U. S. App. D. C.
321, 340, 825 F. 2d 458, 477 (1987) (Williams, J ., dissenting).
Employment discrimination claims require factfinders to
make difficult and sensitive decisions. Sometimes this may
mean that no finding of discrimination is justified even
though a qualified employee is passed over by a less than admirable employer. In other cases, Title VII's protections
properly extend to plaintiffs who are by _no means model employees. As JUSTICE BRENNAN notes, ante, at 28, courts do
not sit to determine whether litigants are nice. In this case,
Hopkins plainly presented a strong case both of her own professional qualifications and of the presence of discrimination
in Price Waterhouse's partnership process. Had the District
Court found on this record that sex discrimination caused the
adverse decision, I doubt it would have been reversible
error. Cf. Aikens, 460 U. S., at 714, n. 2. That decision
was for the finder of fact, however, and the District Court
made plain that sex discrimination was not a but-for cause of
the decision to place Hopkin's partnership candidacy on hold.
Attempts to evade tough decisions by erecting novel theories
of liability or multitiered systems of shifting burdens are
misguided.
IV
The language of Title VII and our well-considered precedents require this plaintiff to establish that the decision
to place her candidacy on hold was made "because of" sex.
Here the District Court found that the "comments of the individual partners and the expert evidence of Dr. Fiske do not
prove an intentional discriminatory motive or purpose," 618
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F. Supp., at 1118, and that "[b]ecause plaintiff has considerable problems dealing with staff and peers, the Court
cannot say that she would have been elected to partnership
if the Policy Board's decision had not been tainted by sexually based evaluations," id., at 1120. Hopkins thus failed
to meet the requisite standard of proof after a full trial. I
would remand the case for entry of judgment in favor of Price
Waterhouse.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the plurality that on the facts presented in this
case, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer
to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have reached the same decision concerning Ann Hopkins' candidacy absent consideration of her gender. I further agree that this burden shift is properly part of the liability phase of the litigation. I thus concur in the judgment
of the Court. My disagreement stems from the plurality's
conclusions concerning the substantive requirement of causation under the statute and its broad statements regarding
the applicability of the allocation of the burden of proof applied in this case. The evidentiary rule the Court adopts
today should be viewed as a supplement to the careful framework established by our unanimous decisions in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), and Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981), for use in cases such as this one where the employer
has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving
substantial weight to an impermissible criterion. I write
separately to explain why I believe such a departure from
the McDonnell Douglas standard is justified in the circumstances presented by this and like cases, and to express my
views as to when and how the strong medicine of requiring
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the employer to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of
causation should be administered.

I
Title VII provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a) (emphasis
added). The legislative history of Title VII bears out what
its plain language suggests: a substantive violation of the
statute only occurs when consideration of an illegitimate criterion is the ~'but-for" cause of an adverse employment action. The legislative history makes it clear that Congress
was attempting to eradicate discriminatory actions in the employment setting, not mere discriminatory thoughts. Critics
of the bill that became Title VII labeled it a "thought control
bill," and argued that it created a "punishable crime that does
not require an illegal external act as a basis for judgment."
100 Cong. Rec. 7254 (1964). Senator Case, whose views the
plurality finds so persuasive elsewhere, responded:
"The man must do or fail to do something in regard to
employment. There must be some specific external act,
more than a mental act. Only if he does the act because
of the grounds stated in the bill would there be any legal
consequences." Ibid.
Thus, I disagree with the plurality's dictum that the words
''because of" do not mean "but-for" causation; manifestly they
do. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. 421, 499
(1986) (WHITE, J ., dissenting) ("[T]he general policy under
Title VII is to limit relief for racial discrimination in employment practices to actual victims of the discrimination"). We
should not, and need not, deviate from that policy today.
The question for decision in this case is what· allocation of the

.
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burden of persuasion on the issue of causation best conforms
with the intent of Congress and the purposes behind Title
VII.
The evidence of congressional intent as to which party
should bear the burden of proof on the issue of causation is
considerably less clear. No doubt, as a general matter, Congress assumed that the plaintiff in a Title VII action would
bear the burden of proof on the elements critical to his or
her case. As the dissent points out, post, at 8, n. 3, the
interpretative memorandum submitted by sponsors of Title
VII indicates that "the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would
have the burden of proving that discrimination had occurred." 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964) (emphasis added).
But in the area of tort liability, from whence the dissent's
''but-for" standard of causation is derived, see post, at 4, the
law has long recognized that in certain "civil cases" leaving
the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to prove "but-for"
causation would be both unfair and destructive of the deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care.
Thus, in multiple causation cases, where a breach of duty has
been established, the common law of torts has long shifted
the burden of proof to multiple defendants to prove that their
negligent actions were not the ''but-for" cause of the plaintiffs
injury. See e. g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 84-87, 199
P. 2d 1, 3-4 (1948). The same rule has been applied where
the effect of a defendant's tortious conduct combines with a
force of unknown or innocent origin to produce the harm to
the plaintiff. See Kingston v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 191
Wis. 610, 616, 211 N. W. 913, 915 (1927) ("Granting that the
union of that fire [caused by defendant's negligence] with another of natural origin, or with another of much greater proportions, is available as a defense, the burden is on the defendant to show that . . . the fire set by him was not the
proximate cause of the damage"). See also 2 J. Wigmore,
Select Cases on the Law of Torts, § 153, p. 865 (1912) (''When
two or more persons by their acts are possibly the sole cause
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of a harm, or when two or more acts of the same person are
possibly the sole cause, and the plaintiff has introduced evidence that one of the two persons, or one of the same person's two acts, is culpable, then the defendant has the burden
of proving that the other person, or his other act, was the
sole cause of the harm").
While requiring that the plaintiff in a tort suit or a Title
VII action prove that the defendant's "breach of duty'' was
the ''but-for" cause of an injury does not generally hamper
effective enforcement of the policies behind those causes of
action,
"at other times the [but-for] test demands the impossible. It challenges the imagination of the trier to probe
into a purely fanciful and unlmowable state of affairs.
He is invited to make an estimate concerning facts that
concededly never existed. The very uncertainty as to
what might have happened opens the door wide for conjecture. But when conjecture is demanded it can be
given a direction that is consistent with the policy
considerations that underlie the controversy." Malone,
Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 67
(1956).
Like the common law of torts, the statutory employment
"tort" created by Title VII has two basic purposes. The first
is to deter conduct which has been identified as contrary
to public policy and harmful to society as a whole. As we
have noted in the past, the award of backpay to a Title VII
plaintiff provides ''the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as
possible, the last vestiges" of discrimination in employment.
Albemare Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975)
(citation omitted). The second goal of Title VII is "to make
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination." Id., at 418.
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Both these goals are reflected in the elements of a disparate treatment action. There is no doubt that Congress considered reliance on gender or race in making employment decisions an evil in itself. As Senator Clark put it, "[t]he bill
simply eliminates consideration of color [or other forbidden
criteria] from the decision to hire or promote." 110 Cong.
Rec. 7218 (1964). See also id., at 13088 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey) (''What the bill does ... is simply to make it
an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment"). Reliance on such factors is exactly what the threat
of Title VII liability was meant to deter. While the main
concern of the statute was with employment opportunity,
Congress was certainly not blind to the stigmatic harm which
co]11es fro_m being evaluated by a process which treats one as
an inferior by reason of one's race or sex. This Court's decisions under the Equal Protection Clause have long recognized that whatever the final outcome of a decisional process,
the inclusion of race or sex as a consideration within it harms
both society and the individual. See Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U. S. - - (1989). At the same time, Congress clearly conditioned legal liability on a determination
that the con·sideration of an illegitimate factor caused a tangible employment injury of some kind.
Where an individual disparate treatment plaintiff has
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in an adverse employment decision, the deterrent purpose of the statute has
clearly been triggered. More importantly, as an evidentiary
matter, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that absent
further explanation, the employer's discriminatory motivation "caused" the employment decision. The employer has
not yet been shown to be a violator, but neither is it entitled
to the same presumption of good faith concerning its employment decisions which is accorded employers facing only circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Both the policies behind· the statute, and the evidentiary principles developed in
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the analogous area of causation in the law of torts, suggest
that at this point the employer may be required to convince
the factfinder that, despite the smoke, there is no fire.
We have given recognition to these principles in our cases
which have discussed the ''remedial phase" of class action disparate treatment cases. Once the class has established that
discrimination against a protected group was essentially the
employer's "standard practice," there has been harm to the
group and injunctive relief is appropriate. But as to the individual members of the class, the liability phase of the litigation is not complete. See Dillon v. Coles, 746 F . 2d 998,
1004 (CA3 1984) ("It is misleading to speak of the additional
proof required by ,an individual class member for relief as
being a part of the damage phase, that evidence is actually
an element of the liability portion of the case") (footnote omitted). Because the class has already demonstrated that, as a
rule, illegitimate factors were considered in the employer's
decisions, the burden shifts to the employer "to demonstrate
that the individual applicant was denied an employment
opportunity for legitimate reasons." Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U. S. 324, 362 (1977). See also Franks v. Bow. man Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 772 (1976).
The individual members of a class action treatment case
stand in much the same position as Ann Hopkins here.
There has been a strong showing that the employer has done
exactly what Title VII forbids, but the connection between
the employer's illegitimate motivation and any injury to the
individual plaintiff is unclear. At this point calling upon the
employer to show that despite consideration of illegitimate
factors the individual plaintiff would not have been hired or
promoted in any event hardly seems "unfair" or contrary to
the substantive command of the statute. In fact, an individual plaintiff who has shown that an illegitimate factor played
a substantial role in the decision in her case has proved more
than the class member in a Teamsters type action. The latter receives the benefit of a burden shift to the defendant

,.,
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based on the likelihood that an illegitimate criterion was a
factor in the individual employment decision.
There is a tension between the Franks and Teamsters
line of decisions and the individual treatment cases cited
by the dissent. See post, at 8-10. Logically, under the dissent's view, each member of a disparate treatment class action would have to show ''but-for" causation as to his or her
individual employment decision, since it is not an element
of the pattern or practice proof of the entire class and it is
statutorily mandated that the plaintiff bear the burden of
proof on this issue throughout the litigation. While the
Court has properly drawn a distinction between the elements
of a class action claim and an individual treatment claim, see
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S.
867, 873-878 (1984), and I do not suggest the wholesale transposition of rules from one setting to the other, our decisions
in Teamsters and Franks do indicate a recognition that presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion based on evidentiary probabilities and the policies behind the statute are not
alien to our Title VII jurisprudence.
Moreover, placing the burden on the defendant in this case
to prove that the same decision would have been justified by
legitimate reasons is consistent with our interpretation of the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Like a disparate treatment plaintiff, one who asserts that governmental
action violates the Equal Protection Clause must show that
he or she is, "the victim of intentional discrimination."
Burdine, 450 U . S., at 256. Compare post, at 8, 11 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) with Washington v. Dams, 426 U. S.
229, 240 (1976). In Alexander v. Lousiana, 405 U. S. 625
(1972), we dealt with a criminal defendant's allegation that
members of his race had been invidiously excluded from the
grand jury which indicted him in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In addition to the statistical evidence presented by petitioner in that case, we noted that the State's
"selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral."
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Id., at 630. Once the consideration of race in the decisional
process had been established, we held that "the burden of
proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral
selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result." Id., at 632.
We adhered to similar principles in Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), a case
which, like this one, presented the problems of motivation
and causation in the context of a multimember decisionmaking body authorized to consider a wide range of factors in
arriving at its decisions. In Arlington Heights a group of
minority plaintiffs claimed that a municipal governing body's
refusal to rezone a plot of land to allow for the construction
of low-income integrated housing was racially motivated.
On the issue of causation, we indicated that the plaintiff was
not required
"to prove that the challenged action rested solely on
racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said
that a legislature or administrative body operating under
a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a
single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the
'dominant' or 'primary' one. In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with
balancing numerous competing considerations that
courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness of irrationality.
But racial discrimination is not just another competing
consideration. When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified." Id.,
at 265-266 (citation omitted).
If the strong presumption of regularity and rationality of
legislative decisionmaking must give way in the face of evidence that race has played a significant part in a legislative decision, I simply cannot believe that Congress intended
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Title VII to accord more deference to a private employer
in the face of evidence that its decisional process has been
substantially infected by discrimination. Indeed, where a
public employee brings a "disparate treatment" claim under
42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause the employee is entitled to the favorable evidentiary framework of
Arlington Heights. See, e.g., Hervey v. City of Little Rock,
787 F . 2d 1223, 1233-1234 (CA8 1986) (applying Arlington
Heights to public employee's claim of sex discrimination in
promotion decision); Lee v. Russell County Board of Education, 684 F. 2d 769, 773-774 (CAll 1982) (applying Arlington
Heights to public employees' claims of race discrimination in
discharge case). Under the dissent's reading of Title VII,
Congress' extension of the coverage of the statute to public
employers in 1972 has placed these employees under a less
favorable evidentiary regime. In my view, nothing in the
language, history, or purpose of Title VII prohibits adoption
of an evidentiary rule which places the burden of persuasion
on the defendant to demonstrate that legitimate concerns
would have justified an adverse employment action where
the plaintiff has convinced the factfinder that a forbidden factor played a substantial role in the employment decision.
Even the dissenting judge below "[had] no quarrel with [the]
principle" that "a party with one permissible motive and one
unlawful one may prevail only by affirmatively proving that
it would have acted as it did even if the forbidden motive
were absent." 263 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 341, 825 F. 2d 458,
478 (1987) (Williams, J. dissenting).
II
The dissent's summary of our individual disparate treatment cases to date is fair and accurate, and amply demonstrates that the rule we adopt today is a at least a change
in dir~ction from some of our prior precedents. See post,
at 8-10. We have indeed emphasized in the past that in an
individual disparate treatment action the plaintiff bears the
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burden of persuasion throughout the litigation. Nor have
we confined the word "pretext" to the narrow definition
which the plurality attempts to pin on it today. See ante,
at 15-17. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine clearly contemplated that a disparate treatment plaintiff could show that
the employer's proffered explanation for an event was not
"the true reason" either because it it never motivated the employer in its employment decisions or because it did not do so
in a particular case. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine assumed that the plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion
as to both these attacks, and we clearly depart from that
framework today. Such a departure requires justification,
and its outlines should be carefully drawn.
First, McDonnell Douglas itself dealt with a situation
where the plaintiff presented no direct evidence that the employer had relied on a forbidden factor under Title VII in
making an employment decision. The prima facie case established there was not difficult to prove, and was based only
on the statistical probability that when a number of potential
causes for an employment decision are eliminated an inference arises that an illegitimate factor was in fact the motivation behind the decision. See Teamsters, 431 U. S., at 358,
n. 44 ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require
direct proof of discrimination"). In the face of this inferential proof, the employer's burden was deemed to be only one
of production; the employer must articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978). The
plaintiff must then be given an "opportunity to demonstrate
by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons
for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 805.
Our decision in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), also involved the "narrow
question" whether, after a plaintiff had carried the ''not onerous" burden of establishing the prima facie case under Mc-

,
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Donnell Douglas, the burden of persuasion should be shifted
to the employer to prove that a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action existed. 450 U. S., at 250. As
the discussion of Teamsters and Arlington Heights indicates,
I do not think that the employer is entitled to the same presumption of good faith where there is direct evidence that it
has placed substantial reliance on factors whose consideration
is forbidden by Title VII.
The only individual treatment case cited by the dissent
which involved the kind of direct evidence of discriminatory
animus with which we are confronted here is United States
Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711
713-714, n. 2 (1983). The question presented to the Court
in that case involved only a challenge to _the elements of the
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, see
Pet. for Cert. in United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aiken, 0. T. 1981, No. 1044, and the question we
confront today was neither briefed nor argued to the Court.
As should be apparent, the entire purpose of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come
by. That the employer's burden in rebutting such an inferential case of discrimination is only one of production does not
mean that the scales should be weighted in the same manner
where there is direct evidence of intentional discrimination.
Indeed, in one Age Discrimination in Employment Act case,
the Court seemed to indicate that "the McDonnell Douglas
test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 121 (1985). See also East Texas
Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404, n. 9 (1977).
Second, the facts of this case, and a growing number like
it decided by the Courts of Appeals, convince me that the evidentiary standard I propose is necessary to make real the
promise of McDonnell Douglas that "[i]n the implementation
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of [employment] decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title
VII tolerates no . . . discrimination, subtle or otherwise."
411 U. S., at 801. In this case, the District Court found that
a number of the evaluations of Ann Hopkins submitted by
partners in the firm overtly referred to her failure to conform
to certain gender stereotypes as a factor militating against
her election to the partnership. 618 F. Supp. 1109,
1116-1117 (1985). The District Court further found that
these evaluations were given "great weight" by the
decisionmakers at Price Waterhouse. Id., at 1118. In addition, the District Court found that the partner responsible for
informing Hopkins of the factors which caused her candidacy
to be placed on hold, indicated that her "professional" problems would be solved if_she would "walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry." Id., at 1117 (footnote omitted). As the
Court of Appeals characterized it, Ann Hopkins proved that
Price Waterhouse "permitt[ed] stereotypical attitudes towards women to play a significant, though unquantifiable,
role in its decision not to invite her to become a partner."
263 U. S. App. D. C., at 324, 825 F. 2d, at 461.
At this point Ann Hopkins had taken her proof as far as
it could go. She had proved discriminatory input into the
decisional process, and had proved that participants in the
process considered her failure to conform to the stereotypes
credited by a number of the decisionmakers had been a substantial factor in the decision. It is as if Ann Hopkins were
sitting in the hall outside the room where partnership decisions were being made. As the partners filed in to consider
her candidacy, she heard several of them them make sexist
remarks in discussing her suitability for partnership. As the
decisionmakers exited the room, she was told by one of those
privy to the decisionmaking process that her gender was a
major reason for the rejection of her partnership bid. If, as
we noted in Teamsters, "[p]resumptions shifting the burden
of proof are often created to reflect judicial evaluations of
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probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access to
the proof," 431 U. S., at 359, n. 45, one would be hard
pressed to think of a situation where it would be more appropriate to require the defendant to show that its decision
would have been justified by wholly legitimate concerns.
Moreover, there is mounting evidence in the decisions of
the lower courts that respondent here is not alone in her inability to pinpoint discrimination as the precise cause of her
injury, despite having shown that it played a significant role
in the decisional process. Many of these courts, which deal
with the evidentiary issues in Title VII cases on a regular
basis, have concluded that placing the risk of nonpersuasion
on the defendant in a situation where uncertainty as to causation has been created by its consideration of an illegitimate
criterion makes sense as a rule of evidence and furthers the
substantive command of Title VII. See, e. g. , Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F . 2d 1552, 1556 (CAll 1983)
(Tjoflat, J.) ("It would be illogical, indeed ironic, to hold a
Title VII plaintiff presenting direct evidence of a defendant's ·
intent to discriminate to a more stringent burden of proof, or
to allow a defendant to meet that direct proof by merely
articulating, but not proving, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its action"). Particularly in the context of the
professional world, where decisions are often made by collegial bodies on the basis of largely subjective criteria, requiring the plaintiff to prove that any one factor was the definitive cause of the decisionmakers' action may be tantamount
to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such decisions. See,
e. g., Fields v. Clark University, 817 F . 2d 931, 935-937
(CAl 1987) (where plaintiff produced "strong evidence" that
sexist attitudes infected faculty tenure decision burden properly shifted to defendant to show that it would have reached
the same decision absent discrimination); Thompkins v. Morris Brown College, 752 F. 2d 558,563 (CAll 1985) (direct evidence of discriminatory animus in decision to discharge college professor shifted burden of persuasion to defendant).
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Finally, I am convinced that a rule shifting the burden to
the defendant where the plaintiff has shown that an illegitimate criterion was a "substantial factor" in the employment
decision will not conflict with other congressional policies embodied in Title VII. Title VII expressly provides that an
employer need not give preferential treatment to employees
or applicants of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in order to maintain a work force in balance with the general population. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(j). The interpretive memorandum, whose authoritative force is noted by
the plurality, see ante, at 13, n. 8, specifically provides:
"There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary, any
deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever
such a balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII
because maintaining such a balance would require an employer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race." 110
Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964).
Last Term, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U. S. - - (1988), the Court unanimously concluded that the
disparate impact analysis first enunciated in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), should be extended to subjective or discretionary selection processes. At the same
time a plurality of the Court indicated concern that the focus
on bare statistics in the disparate impact setting could force
employers to adopt "inappropriate prophylactic measures" in
violation of§ 2000e-2(j). The plurality went on to emphasize
that in a disparate impact case, the plaintiff may not simply
point to a statistical disparity in the employer's work force.
Instead, the plaintiff must identify a particular employment
practice and "must offer statistical evidence of a kind and
degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has
caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group." 487 U. S.,
at - - . The plurality indicated that "the ultimate burden of
proving that discrimination against a protected group has
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been caused by a specific employment practice remains with
the plaintiff at all times." Id., at--.
I believe there are significant differences between shifting
the burden of persuasion to the employer in a case resting
purely on statistical proof as in the disparate impact setting
and shifting the burden of persuasion in a case like this one,
where an employee has demonstrated by direct evidence that
an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in a particular employment decision. First, the explicit consideration of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in making employment decisions "was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII." Teamsters, 431 U. S., at
335, n. 15. While the prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas and the statistical showing of imbalance involved in
an impact case may both be indicators of discrimination or its
''functional equivalent," they are not, in and of themselves,
the evils Congress sought to eradicate from the employment
setting. Second, shifting the burden of persuasion to the
employer in a situation like this one creates no incentive
to preferential treatment in violation of § 2000e-(2)(j). To
avoid bearing the burden of justifying its decision, the employer need not seek racial or sexual balance in its work
force; rather, all it need do is avoid substantial reliance on
forbidden criteria in making its employment decisions.
While the danger of forcing employers to engage in unwarranted preferential treatment is thus less dramatic in
this setting than in the situation the Court faced in Watson,
it is far from wholly illusory. Based on its misreading of
the words ''because of" in the statute, see ante, at 9-12, the
plurality appears to conclude that if a decisional process is
''tainted" by awareness of sex or race in any way, the employer has violated the statute, and Title VII thus commands
that the burden shift to the ·employer to justify its decision.
Ante, at 21-22. The plurality thus effectively reads the causation requirement out of the statute, and then replaces it
with an "affirmative defense." Ante, at 15-17.
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In my view, in order to justify shifting the burden on the
issue of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment
plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate
criterion was a substantial factor in the decision. As the
Court of Appeals noted below, "[w]hile most circuits have not
confronted the question squarely, the consensus among those
that have is that once a Title VII plaintiff has demonstrated
by direct evidence that discriminatory animus played a significant or substantial role in the employment decision, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that the decision would
have been the same absent discrimination." 263 U. S. App.
D. C., at 233-244, 825 F. 2d, at 470-471. Requiring that the
plaintiff demonstrate that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in the employment decision identifies those employment situations where the deterrent purpose of Title VII
is most clearly implicated. As an evidentiary matter, where
a plaintiff has made this type of strong showing of illicit motivation, the fact:finder is entitled to presume that the employer's discriminatory animus made a difference to the outcome,
absent proof to the contrary from the employer. Where a
disparate treatment plaintiff has made such a showing, the
burden then rests with the employer to convince the trier of
fact that it is more likely than not that the decision would
have been the same absent consideration of the illegitimate
factor. The employer need not isolate the sole cause for the
decision, rather it must demonstrate that with the illegitimate factor removed from the calculus, sufficient business
reasons would have induced it to take the same employment
action. This evidentiary scheme essentially requires the employer to place the employee in the same position he or she
would have occupied absent discrimination. Cf. Mt. Healthy
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 286 (1977). If
the employer fails to carry this burden, the fact:finder is justified in concluding that the decision was made "because of"
consideration of the illegitimate factor and the substantive
standard for liability under the statute is satisfied.
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Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, see Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 63-69 (1986), cannot justify requiring
the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions
were based on legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself suffice to satisfy the
plaintiff's burden in this regard. In addition, in my view testimony such as Dr. Fiske's in this case, standing alone, would
not justify shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer.
Race and gender always "play a role" in an employment decision in the benign sense that these are human characteristics
of which decisionmakers are aware and may comment on in a
perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory fashion; · - For example, in the context of this case, a mere reference to "a lady
candidate" might show that gender "played a role" in the decision, but by no means could support a rational factfinder's
inference that the decision was made "because of" sex.
What is-required is what Ann Hopkins showed here: direct
evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision.
It should be obvious that the threshold standard I would
adopt for shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant
differs substantially from that proposed by the plurality, the
plurality's suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding. See
ante, at 20, n. 13. The plurality proceeds from the premise
that the words "because of" in the statute do not embody any
causal requirement at all. Under my approach, the plaintiff
must produce evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate
criterion was a substantial factor in the particular employment decision such that a reasonable factfinder could draw an
inference that the decision was made "because of" the plaintiff's protected status. Only then would the burden of proof
shift to the defendant to prove that the decision would have
been justified by other, wholly legitimate considerations.
See also ante, at 2 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment).
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In sum, because of the concerns outlined above, and because I believe that the deterrent purpose of Title VII is
disserved by a rule which places the burden of proof on plaintiffs on the issue of causation in all circumstances, I would
retain but supplement the framework we established in McDonnell Douglas and subsequent cases. The structure of
the presentation of evidence in an individual treatment case
should conform to the general outlines we established in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. First, the plaintiff must establish the McDonell Douglas prima facie case by showing
membership in a protected group, qualification for the job,
rejection for the position, and that after rejection the employer continued to seek applicants of complainant's general
qualifications. McDonnell Douglas-,- 411 U. S., at 802. The
plaintiff should also present any direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the decisional process. The defendant
should then present its case, including its evidence as to legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision. As the dissent notes, under this framework, the employer ''has every incentive to convince the trier of fact that
the decision was lawful." Post, at 14, citing Bu1·dine, 450
U. S., at 258. Once all the evidence has been received, the
court should determine whether the McDonnell Douglas or
Price Waterhouse framework properly applies to the evidence before it. If the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Price
Waterhouse threshold, the case should be decided under the
principles enunciated in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine,
with the plaintiff bearing the burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue whether the employment action was taken because of discrimination. In my view, such a system is both
fair and workable and it calibrates the evidentiary requirements demanded of the parties to the goals behind the statute itself.
I agree with the dissent, see post, at 14-15, n. 4, that the
evidentiary framework I propose should be available to all
disparate treatment plaintiffs where an illegitimate consid-
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eration played a substantial role in an adverse employment
decision. The Court's allocation of the burden of proof in
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U. S. 616, 626-627
(1987), rested squarely on "the analytical framework set forth
in McDonnell Douglas," id., at 626, which we alter today.
It would be odd to say the least if the evidentiary rules applicable to Title VII actions were themselves dependent on
the gender or the skin color of the litigants. But see, ante,
at 8, n. 3.
In this case, I agree with the plurality that petitioner
should be called upon to show that the outcome would have
been the same if respondent's professional merit had been its
only concern. On remand, the District Court should determine whether Price Waterhouse has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that jf gender had not been part of the
process, its employment decision concerning Ann Hopkins
would nonetheless have been the same.

